Liberal Professor Stephen M. Walt, my favorite writer in "Foreign Policy Magazine" - It is amazing how I very often agree with this author.
My comment :
We should all be ashamed by what Europe has done to the Arabs in 1,000 yeas starting with the crusades, for Napoleon Bonaparte murdering Arab Prisoners in the most coward form. For more than two hundred years of Brutal Colonization, Murders, Tortures, Lies, Deception, etc ... against the Arabs.
Should I vote for new episodes of ReColonization, or NeoColonialism ?? -- No Way ! --- Behind the Humanitarian and Altruistic Motives there are wolves with sheep skins.
I am obsessed always preaching the DeWesternization and DeWhitenization of the Whole World - That is what has been happening since Queen Victoria's Jubilee in Britain 1896.
Ostwald Spengler was not totally wrong went he wrote "Der Untergang des Westens" in 1917... He was a fanatic Germanophile and even a Jingoist, but he was intelligent, erudite and prophet enough to see that something was wrong with the Western Nations and that God had not written the Future to them.
This Libyan Episode is extremely ridiculous in "Le Cirque du Soleil" of our present day History.
Foreign Policy Magazine
What should we do about Libya? (updated)
By Stephen M. Walt
March 8, 2011
What should we do about Libya? (updated)
Some excerpts :
But here's where it gets messy (as usual). Russia opposes outside military intervention in Libya, which means that the Security Council is unable to authorize intervention along the lines suggested by R2P. (This is one reason why some of us were skeptical about the whole R2P initiative from the get-go). An alternative approach would have NATO or the EU or some coalition of regional organizations authorize outside action, but as numerous observers have already noted, this approach generates echoes of past colonial interference and could lend a certain (false) credence to Qaddafi's propaganda, which has sought to portray the rebels as some sort of foreign plot. Then remember that U.S. military forces are badly overstretched (which is why Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been pouring cold water on the idea of a no-fly zone), and we've spent the past decade fighting wars in several other Muslim countries. Add all this up, and Obama's reluctance to send the Marines or impose a "no-fly zone" is understandable. It is not entirely clear that such a zone would make that much difference.
What this dilemma also highlights is the price the United States and its allies pay for the gross imbalance between U.S. military capabilities and those of its NATO partners. In practical terms, any strategically meaningful military intervention in Libya would depend almost entirely on U.S. forces and logistics. We might get some symbolic help from our NATO allies, but as in the Balkan wars, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the bulk of the heavy lifting would be borne by Uncle Sam. And that means that the United States will incur most if not all of the reputational costs for once again interfering in the Middle East, especially if the decision went awry in any way.
Back in the 1990s, Europeans (and Europhiles) spoke glowingly about the rise of Europe's "civilian power," which was seen as an alternative to America's old-fashioned preoccupation with military force and as a more useful tool in the postmodern 21st century. The Libyan crisis reminds us that this sort of civilian power is of little use against well-armed opponents who are willing to use force and that "hard power" of the sort that only the United States now possesses is indispensable. (The fact that Washington sometimes uses its capabilities unwisely is a separate issue). The problem is that the United States has good reasons to refrain from using its hard power in this case, yet our longtime strategic partners are incapable of action on their own. The irony is that Europe's strategic interests are more fully engaged by events in Libya (if only because of the fear of large refugee flows), yet Europe lacks the capacity to do much in response.
If it were up to me, therefore, I'd use all nonmilitary means at my disposal to undermine Qaddafi's hold on power, and I'd stand ready to help Libya reform and rebuild in the event that his government finally falls. If other states want to funnel military aid to the rebel forces, I wouldn't object. If, as some sources suggest, Qaddafi himself might eventually be willing to leave power in exchange for a guarantee against prosecution, I might reluctantly take that deal for the sake of the greater good, however unjust it might be. But based on what has occurred thus far, I wouldn't be trying to organize a U.S.-led military intervention.