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Text of Decision here. Racial Profiling is perfectly legal, constitutional and supports SB 1070. Used for "War on Drugs", Terrorism, etc ....
Bibliography on Legality of "Racial Profiling"
Bernstein, Steven K. (1990). "Fourth Amendment—Using the Drug Courier Profile to Fight the War on Drugs". Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (Northwestern University) 80 (4): 996–1017. doi:10.2307/1143688. JSTOR 1143688.
Johnson, Kevin R., How Racial Profiling in America Became the 'Law of the Land': United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Rebellious Lawyering, 98 Georgetown Law Journal 1005 (2009)]
Smith, Michael R.; Alpert, Geoffrey P. (2002). "Searching for direction: Courts, social science, and the adjudication of racial profiling claims". Justice Quarterly 19 (4): 673–703. doi:10.1080/07418820200095391.
Soltero, Carlos R. (2006). "United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), law and order on the border". Latinos and American Law: Landmark Supreme Court Cases. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. pp. 107–117. ISBN 0292714114.
FindLaw.com
For Legal Professionals
U.S. Supreme Court - UNITED STATES v. BRIGNONI-PONCE 1975
UNITED STATES v. BRIGNONI-PONCE, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)
Some excerpts :
The Fourth Amendment held not to allow a roving patrol of the Border Patrol to stop a vehicle near the Mexican border and question its occupants about their citizenship and immigration status, when the only ground for suspicion is that the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry. Except at the border and its functional equivalents, patrolling officers may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warranting suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country. Pp. 878-887.
(a) Because of the important governmental interest in preventing the illegal entry of aliens at the border, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, an officer, whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, may stop the car briefly, question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and ask them to explain suspicious circumstances; but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause. Pp. 878-882.
(b) To allow roving patrols the broad and unlimited discretion urged by the Government to stop all vehicles in the border area without any reason to suspect that they have violated any law, would not be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 882-883.
(c) Assuming that Congress has the power to admit aliens on condition that they submit to reasonable questioning about their right to be in the country, such power cannot diminish the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who may be mistaken for aliens. The Fourth Amendment therefore forbids stopping persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens. Pp. 883-884.
499 F.2d 1109, affirmed. [422 U.S. 873, 874]
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 887. BURGER, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 899. DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 888. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 914.
Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for the United States. On the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Petersen, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Mark L. Evans, Peter M. Shannon, Jr., and Jerome M. Feit.
John J. Cleary, by appointment of the Court, 419 U.S. 1017 , argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Charles M. Sevilla. *
[ Footnote * ] Sanford Jay Rosen filed a brief for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises questions as to the United States Border Patrol's authority to stop automobiles in areas near the Mexican border. It differs from our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), in that the Border Patrol does not claim authority to search cars, but only to question the occupants about their citizenship and immigration status.
I
As part of its regular traffic-checking operations in southern California, the Border Patrol operates a fixed checkpoint on Interstate Highway 5 south of San Clemente. On the evening of March 11, 1973, the checkpoint was closed because of inclement weather, but two officers were observing northbound traffic from a patrol [422 U.S. 873, 875] car parked at the side of the highway. The road was dark, and they were using the patrol car's headlights to illuminate passing cars. They pursued respondent's car and stopped it, saying later that their only reason for doing so was that its three occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent. The officers questioned respondent and his two passengers about their citizenship and learned that the passengers were aliens who had entered the country illegally. All three were then arrested, and respondent was charged with two counts of knowingly transporting illegal immigrants, a violation of 274 (a) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 228, 8 U.S.C. 1324 (a) (2). At trial respondent moved to suppress the testimony of and about the two passengers, claiming that this evidence was the fruit of an illegal seizure. The trial court denied the motion, the aliens testified at trial, and respondent was convicted on both counts.
Respondent's appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit when we announced our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of roving patrols to search vehicles, without a warrant or probable cause, at points removed from the border and its functional equivalents. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that the stop in this case more closely resembled a roving-patrol stop than a stop at a traffic checkpoint, and applied the principles of Almeida-Sanchez. 1 [422 U.S. 873, 876] The court held that the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted in Almeida-Sanchez, forbids stopping a vehicle, even for the limited purpose of questioning its occupants, unless the officers have a "founded suspicion" that the occupants are aliens illegally in the country. The court refused to find that Mexican ancestry alone supported such a "founded suspicion" and held that respondent's motion to suppress should have been granted. 2 499 F.2d 1109 (1974). We granted certiorari and set the case for oral argument with No. 73-2050, United States v. Ortiz, post, p. 891, and No. 73-6848, Bowen v. United States, post, p. 916. 419 U.S. 824 (1974).
The Government does not challenge the Court of Appeals' factual conclusion that the stop of respondent's car was a roving-patrol stop rather than a checkpoint stop. Brief for United States 8. Nor does it challenge the retroactive application of Almeida-Sanchez, supra, Brief for United States 9, or contend that the San Clemente checkpoint is the functional equivalent of the border. The only issue presented for decision is whether a roving patrol may stop a vehicle in an area near the border and question its occupants when the only ground for suspicion is that the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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